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The recent financial crisis in the Nigerian banking sector which has been adduced to the 
abuse of corporate governance practices have been identified as one of the factors that led 
to the removal of some CEOs. Therefore, this study examined the impact of corporate 
governance on the financial performance of bailed-out banks in Nigeria. The corporate 
governance variables include: board size, CEO duality, non-executive directors in audit 
committee, percentage of women on the board and board independence while return on 
assets was used to measure financial performance. Data were collected from the annual 
reports of the six bailed-out banks in Nigeria from 2003 - 2009. The data were analysed 
using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS). The results showed that there was no significant 
positive relationship between audit committee, board size, board independence and return 
on assets. It was also established that though the removal of the CEOs could have a 
political undertone (outside the scope of this study), the CEOs and the management of the 
affected banks flagrantly flayed some provisions in the SEC Code, especially in terms of 
compositions. It is, therefore, recommended that banks should be made to adhere strictly 
to the existing code of corporate governance for the provisions (especially in terms of 
composition) to have a maximum and significant impact on the firm financial 
performance.  
 
Keywords: Corporate governance Characteristics, Financial Performance, CEOs, Banks, 
Nigeria   
INTRODUCTION 
On August 14, 2009, the Governor of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (hereafter CBN) in exercising his 
powers as contained in Sections 33 and 35 of the 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions (BOFI) Act 
1991, as amended, announced the firing of the 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and the board of 
directors of five commercial banks. Forty-eight 
days later, on October 2, 2009 to be precise, the 
CBN announced additional sack of three bank 
CEOs and their respective boards of directors and 
in their stead placed CBN-appointed CEOs and 
directors. In total, eight bank CEOs and their 
respective board of directors were fired from their 
jobs. The affected banks were Afribank Plc, 
Platinum Habib Bank (PHB) Plc, Equatorial Trust 
Bank Plc, Finland Plc, Intercontinental Bank Plc, 
Oceanic Bank Plc, Spring Bank Plc and Union 
Bank Plc (Chiejine, 2010). 
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Babatunde (2009) in viewing the issue of personal 
interest, asserted that lack of commitment to high 
ethical standards on the part of the board of 
directors, mismanagement of banks‟ funds (that is, 
where managers of the banks engaged in money 
laundering of about 60% of the total funds to 
foreign accounts) as some of the factors that 
brought the financial sector to near collapse. This 
assertion was supported by Quadri (2010) that the 
recent insider trading, massive and prevalent 
frauds, mandatory retirement of banks CEOs due 
to corrupt practices and inefficient rubber-
stamped boards, were all combined to signal the 
absence of or failure of existing corporate 
governance structure in Nigeria. Sanusi (2010) 
agreed that the weak corporate governance and 
unbridled corruption in financial institutions were 
at the root of the banking sector crisis that almost 
led to the collapse of the system in 2009. Thus, the 
question still remains: what are the extent of abuse 
and weakness of the corporate governance 
practice and the resultant consequences on the 
performance of the affected banks in isolation? 
Secondly, this study considered whether the 
removal of the CEOs was purely because of abuse 
of corporate governance practices as claimed by 
the CBN governor or politically motivated as 
maintained in some quarters. The objective of this 
study, therefore, is to examine the relationship 
between the internal corporate governance 
mechanisms in terms of board independence, 
audit committee independence, CEO duality, 
percentage of women on the board, board size and 
firm performance in the context of Nigeria, while 
performance is captured by Return on Assets 
(ROA). 
The remaining part of the paper is separated into 
four parts. Part 2 discusses the literature and 
hypotheses development and part 3 the 
methodology, part 4 discusses the analysis and 
implication of findings while part 5 is the 
conclusion and recommendation.  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Corporate Governance: Case of Eight Bailed out 
Banks (with CEOs removed) in Nigeria. 
The corporate governance practices in Nigeria 
have been a subject of abuse over time. 
Practitioners have failed to follow the spirit of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Codes 
(referring to SEC Code 2003) put in place to ensure 
businesses run well and the interest of various 
stakeholders are adequately protected have not 
been strictly adhered to especially when banks 
were asked to re-consolidate with N25 billion 
minimum capital. The result was the institutional 
failures in the Nigerian banking sector as 
witnessed recently. The consolidation exercise 
made some banks officials who were obviously 
not prepared intellectually as to how to manage 
the found judiciously for improved performance, 
began to flout, subvert and manipulate the 
corporate governance practices as enshrined and 
stipulated in the SEC code 2003 which was termed 
weak. The weakness observed in the SEC code 
2003 necessitated the birth of SEC code 2011. The 
2011 code of corporate governance was an 
improvement over the 2003 SEC code to cater for 
some lapses observed in the previous code. 
However, before the introduction of the SEC code 
2011, according to Sanusi (2010), some banks had 
already enmeshed themselves in unethical 
dealings which the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
documented in the various examinations carried 
out on commercial banks in Nigeria.  Therefore, 
corporate governance can be seen as the major 
factor contributed to the near collapse of the 
banking sector in Nigeria.  
As a result, few „powerful‟ individuals continued 
to have benefits in term of obtaining loans and 
other related facilities sometimes with little or no 
securities to match to the detriment of genuine 
borrowers who would have channelled same 
funds to the productive sector of the economy. To 
further worsen the situation, some members of the 
board that could have served as independent 
persons to monitor and provide oversight 
functions over the affairs of the management, 
were compromised by the executives. It was 
reported according to Sanusi (2010) that, some 
board members were found securing credits 
without adequate collateral which made 
impossible for them to enshrine sound corporate 
governance practices in the banks and to also 
challenge the executives. It was discovered from 
the finding of the CBN audit report that, most of 
the loans given out were unsecured and no 
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adequate provision for bad debts was made. 
Hence,  
 to  Sanusi further opined, that, corporate 
governance in many banks failed because boards 
ignored these practices for reasons including 
being misled by executive management, 
participating themselves in obtaining un-secured 
loans at the expense of depositors and not having 
the qualifications to enforce good governance on 
bank management. In addition, the audit process 
at all banks appeared not to have taken fully into 
account the rapid deterioration of the economy 
and hence of the need for aggressive provisioning 
against risk assets. 
As banks grew in size and complexity, bank 
boards often did not fulfil their functions and 
were lulled into a sense of well-being by the 
apparent year-over year growth in assets and 
profits. In hindsight, boards and executive 
management in some major banks were not 
equipped to run their institutions. Some banks‟ 
chairmen/CEOs were seen often to have an 
overbearing influence on the board, and some 
boards lacked independence; directors often failed 
to make meaningful contributions to safeguard the 
growth and development of the bank and had 
weak ethical standards; the board committees 
were also often ineffective or dormant. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) published 
details of the extent of insider abuse in several of 
the banks and it was revealed that CEOs set up 
Special Purpose Vehicles to lend money to 
themselves for stock price manipulation or the 
purchase of estates all over the world. For 
instance, one bank borrowed money and 
purchased private jets which the Apex bank later 
discovered were registered in the name of the 
CEO‟s son. In another bank, the management set 
up 100 fake companies for the purpose of 
perpetrating fraud. The various insider trading 
and abuse of corporate governance as published in 
the CBN/NDIC special audit report are 
considered below 
TABLE 1 HERE 
The table  was came by as a result of special audit 
jointly conducted by CBN and Nigerian Deposit 
Insurance Company (NDIC) in 2009 after the 
replacement of Prof. Charles Soludo with Sanusi 
Lamido Sanusi in the face of uncertainty which 
beclouded the financial sector throughout the 
period of the credit crunch and the global financial 
crisis. Certain parameters were used e.g. capital 
adequacy, corporate governance and liquidity. 
The total number of banks audited was 24 and 
according to the CBN announcement, 14 banks 
passed on all parameters. One bank was found 
wanting on two grounds while the remaining nine 
were found to be in a grave situation. 
The result of the special audit prompted the CBN 
to take the decisions as presented in the table 
below 
TABLE 2 HERE 
To save the banks from total collapse, the CBN 
had to inject a total of N620billion of tax payers‟ 
money in nine of the banks with liquidity and 
capital adequacy issues in order to stabilize their 
operations, and removed and replaced the 
executive management in eight of the banks. 
However, two banks were given June 2010 as a 
deadline for recapitalization. 
In addition, some of the banks that were bailed 
out as a result of illiquidity and poor corporate 
governance engaged in some insider related 
abuses that led to their abysmal performance. This 
is shown below. 
TABLE 3 HERE 
Table 2.3 shows the total insider related loans that 
took place between 2006 and 2009. That is the 
years that preceded the period some banks 
executives were removed in the Nigerian banking 
sector. From the table, there was a significant 
increase of insider related loans over 2006 as a 
result of the then just concluded consolidation 
exercise that made all the banks assessed billions 
of dollars of shareholders fund. The 
unpreparedness of the boards and particularly the 
CEOs as to how to engage the fund coupled with 
weak corporate governance as reported by CBN 
suggested the rise up till 2008. However, in 2009, a 
significant drop in the insider related loans as a 
result of CBN special audit that took place during 
the year was witnessed. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
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The table 2.4 shows the various insider abuses that 
took place especially among the rescued banks in 
Nigeria. Moses (2011) argues that the troubled 
banks represent over 32% of banks in the Nigerian 
banking sector and that these banks have about 
35.6% of industry assets, 36.11% of total loans, 
34.52% of total deposits and about 60.75% of the 
industry‟s non-performing loan. All the banks 
identified in table 2.7 participated significantly but 
most importantly, Oceanic and Wema bank in 
2007. Although, the CBN special audit took place 
in 2009, Union bank still engaged in insider 
related loans amounting to over two billion naira.  
There is no surprise therefore that these banks 
failed the three tests of liquidity, capital adequacy 
and corporate governance tests. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria also documented 
special cases of three banks that directly flouted 
the corporate governance during the course of 
their leadership and most especially during the 
recapitalization exercise. These cases are reported 
in the table below. 
TABLE 5 HERE 
The collapse of the capital market wiped out these 
customer deposits amounting to hundreds of 
billions of naira. Therefore, a lot of the capital 
supposedly raised by these so called “mega 
banks” was fake capital financed from depositors‟ 
funds. Based on this, it was concluded that the 
consolidation process was a sham and the banks 
never raised the capital they claimed they did 
(www.centbank.com).  
The effect of these cases on the quality of financial 
reporting in the Banking sector was therefore 
negative. Little surprise why regulatory 
authorities and stakeholders were calling for the 
revisiting of corporate governance and how it can 
be made more effective with audit committee seen 
as the most veritable tool. Hence, reason the 
provision for audit committee was repackaged in 
SEC Code of 2011 and CBN Code of 2006 by 
making sure that audit committee members have 
the financial and accounting skills, independence 
and knowledge of the industry to be able to 
effectively provide adequate oversight functions 
over the activities of the management and the 
system of internal control in ensuring quality 
financial reporting in Nigeria.    
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 Audit Committee Independence and Financial 
performance  
Audit committee represents the most reliable 
guardians of publicly quoted company. It has been 
established that audit committee is far more 
relevant to the organizational governance than 
other forms of committees (Owolabi and Dada, 
2011). However, this study considers the 
independence of the audit committee as most 
germane to the financial performance of the 
organization which is measured by the numbers 
of non-executive. Klein (2002) found that the 
inclusion of outside directors on the board 
enhances corporate performance and the returns 
to shareholders. Similarly, independent directors 
are better monitors of management than are inside 
directors (DeFond and Francis, 2005). In like 
manner, the outside directors are seen as acting in 
the interest of shareholders in that the 
appointment of outside directors is accompanied 
by significantly positive excess returns (Sanda, 
Garba & Mikailu, 2011). Based on the foregoing, 
the following hypothesis is proposed 
H1: there is no significant relationship between 
audit committee independence and Return on 
Asset of the bailed out banks in Nigeria 
Board Independence and Financial performance 
The board of directors is held responsible for 
every decision that is ever made in an 
organization and also ensures that top managers 
work effectively and efficiently daily (Fox and 
Opong, 1999; Adelegan, 2007). The independent 
directors play a role of a referee and implement 
the principles of corporate governance that protect 
the rights of shareholders (Bhagat and Jefferis, 
2002). However, control by insiders may lead to 
transfer of wealth to managers at the expense of 
the shareholders (Beasley 1996; Fama 1980). 
Therefore, outside directors are appointed on the 
board mainly to obtain independent monitoring 
mechanism over the board process thereby 
reducing agency conflicts and improve 
performance (Craven & Wallace 2001). This study 
therefore hypothesized as follows 
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H1: there is no significant relationship between 
board independence and Return on Asset of the 
bailed out banks in Nigeria 
CEO Duality and Financial performance  
Yermack (1996) found that firms are more 
valuable when different persons occupy the offices 
of board chair and CEO. Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2007) posited that the fusion of the two offices 
negatively affects a firm‟s performance, as the firm 
has less access to debt finance. This was also 
argued by White and Ingrassia (1992) that CEO 
duality leads to worse performance as the board 
cannot fire an underperforming CEO and can 
create an agency cost if the CEO pursues his own 
interest at the cost of the shareholders. However, 
separation of these two officers is however not 
supported by Donaldson and Davis (1991) that 
shareholders‟ returns are maximized when there is 
duality. This hypothesis is therefore drawn 
H1: there is no significant relationship between 
CEO Duality and Return on Asset of the bailed out 
banks in Nigeria 
Board Size and Financial performance  
Since the board of directors is the most important 
device to monitor the management, the 
independency of board members has become a 
significant issue (Abdullah 2004). The size of a 
large board results to a range of expertise that 
makes better decisions for the firm, and also 
because of the size of a large board the CEO 
cannot dominate it because of the collective 
strength and can resist the irrational decisions of a 
CEO (Zahra & Peace, 1989). The results of the 
study of Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) indicated that 
large boards enhanced shareholders‟ wealth more 
positively than smaller ones. However, Yermack 
(1996), Sanda, Mikailu and Garba (2005), Ojeka, 
Iyoha and Obigbemi (2013) differed and posited 
that small boards are more efficient in decision-
making because there is less agency cost among 
the board members which is more associated 
positively with high firm performance. This study 
therefore hypothesized that: 
H1: there is no significant relationship between 
Board Size and Return on Asset of the bailed out 
banks in Nigeria 
 
Gender Diversity and Financial performance 
Nowell and Tinkler (1994) found that women are 
more cooperative than men and they increase firm 
value. Hudson (2007) also add that the fact that 
women drive more than 80 % of consumer 
decisions in households indicates the depth of 
customer understanding that women can bring 
commercial needs. In addition, Nirosha and Stuart 
(2013) found a significant negative relationship 
between the proportion of women on boards and 
firm value along with an increase in company 
agency cost. A study by Jude (2003) however 
suggests that companies with female directors 
tend to perform less well than companies with all 
male boards. Bhagat and Black (1999) also posited 
that institutional investors may react negatively to 
firms that appoint women board members. Based 
on the foregoing, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H1: there is no significant relationship between 
gender diversity and return on asset of the bailed 
out banks in Nigeria 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This sampling technique was chosen based on the 
peculiarity of this study. The kind of non-
probability sampling technique used was 
judgemental sampling. The sample size of this 
study is made up of the six listed bailed-out 
banks; the time frame considered for this study is 
from 2003 to 2009. The data was derived from the 
audited financial statements of the banks listed in 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) between the 
seven years period of 2003 and 2009. 
The firm performance was measured by Return on 
Asset (ROA) as the dependent variable while the 
independent variables were measured by four 
corporate governance characteristics namely: 
Chief Executive Officer Duality (CEOD), Board 
Independence (BOARDIN), Board Size (BSIZE), 
Audit Committee (ACMTEE) and Gender 
Diversity (GENDIVER) 
TABLE 6 HERE 
Model Specification 
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However, the following mathematical model was 
developed to analyze the relationship between 
financial performance and audit committee 
characteristics as represented below 
Y= β0 + β X1 
+µit..................................................................... (1) 
Where, Y is the dependent variable. β0 is constant, 
β  is the coefficient of the explanatory variable 
(audit committee characteristics), βX1 is the 
explanatory variable and eit is the error term. 
By adopting the economic model as in equation (1) 
above specifically to this study, equation 
(2 & 3) below evolved. 
ROAit= BSIZEit + CEODit+ 
BCOMit+AUDCOMMit+GENDIVERit........... (2) 
Based on regression, the model specification is: 
ROAit= β0+β1BSIZEit+ β2CEODit+ β3 
BCOMit+β4AUDCOMM+ 
β5GENDIVERµit...................(3) 
Analysis and Presentation of Results 
The data presented involved tables and figures 
which were used for the descriptive statistics and 
correlation analysis and regression analysis for the 
hypotheses testing level.  
TABLE 7 HERE 
The result in table 4.1 shows that on the average, 
the return on asset of the bailed out banks was 
1.336%. This could be as a result of internal 
inefficiency of the management in managing the 
assets of the companies for maximum yield which 
was later resulted in the removal of the CEOs for 
non performance and abuse of corporate 
governance practices (Sanusi, 2010). The average 
board size of the banks was 15 members with just 
2% non-executive directors that could safeguard 
the integrity and also promote the independence 
of the board from CEOs and the management. The 
implication of this is that, the board lacked 
independence and made it easy for the CEOs to 
have a free ride which ultimately led to account 
restatements of some of the affected banks.  
Furthermore, the table showed that, on the 
average, there was a presence of CEO in the audit 
committee coupled with 40% non-executive 
directors in the audit committee as against 50% 
minimum specified in the Securities and Exchange 
Commission Code 2003 and 100% specified in the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Code 2013. 
The result made the audit committee a rubber 
stamp to whatever the management of the affected 
banks present instead of carrying out their duties 
of ensuring sound corporate governance, internal 
control and putting the management on their toes 
to do the right thing. In addition, the table showed 
that, on the average, 5 women were on the board 
and also averagely, there was a CEO duality 
which means, the same person occupying the 
position of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
as against the stipulated policy of separation as 
specified in the SEC Code. 
TABLE 8  HERE 
The table shows the mean result of each of the six 
bailed banks sampled in this study. While 
Afribank recorded the highest return on asset 
(ROA) for the period studied, First Inland Bank 
recorded negative in its ROA followed by Oceanic 
Bank and Union Bank. Interestingly, Oceanic, First 
Inland and Plantinum Bank with mean score of 13, 
15 and 18 members on the audit committee board 
respectively, showed that 60%, 50% and 50% of 
audit committee members of these banks were 
non-executive directors which mean the audit 
committee was relatively independent. Whereas, 
Afri and Intercontinental bank showed displayed 
less than 20% of non-executive directors which 
means the audit committee lacked independence. 
But surprisingly, both Oceanic and 
Intercontinental bank audit committee also 
showed that the CEOs of these banks were 
members of the audit committee which makes it 
difficult for the committee to bite. Board duality 
was also recorded in the case of Oceanic and 
Intercontinental bank during the period of study 
though the mean score was low. 
Test of Correlation and Multicollinearity between 
independent variables and ROA 
Pearson Moment Correlation was performed on 
both the dependent and independent variables to 
check for multicollinearity and relationship 
between the various variables in the study. Hair, 
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Black, Babin and Anderson (2010); Gujarati and 
Porter (2009) suggested 0.8 as the threshold at 
which multicollinearity concerns may harm the 
regression analysis and make the reliability or the 
positive power of the model as a whole to be 
reduced. 
TABLE 9  HERE 
The correlation matrix as shown in table 4.3 
indicates that the assumption of multi collinearity 
has not been violated because none of the 
variables is greater than 0.7 and 0.8. Where this 
assumption was violated, this has been taken care 
of though the table not shown in this study. All 
the variables were positively negatively correlated 
to one another. 
TABLE 10  HERE 
From the results in Table 4.3.2, the board size 
(BSIZE) was positive and insignificant against 
return on asset (ROA). This indicates that, large 
board size increases financial performance. This 
result is in line with Cheng (2008), who posited 
that larger boards have lower variability of 
corporate performance. That is, larger boards are 
less risk-taking and more conservative, and, as 
such, appear to be an effective corporate 
governance mechanism. The result is however 
significant which could mean that the board were 
less effective to impact positively on ROA in the 
bailed out banks. In addition, the board 
independence (BINDP) and audit committee 
independence (ACINDP) had positive coefficients 
but insignificants. This could mean that, even 
though, the non- executive directors looked 
independent in term of composition but in reality, 
they CEOs presence in some of the audit 
committee and the power they willed mitigate the 
benefits of board independence in the bailed out 
banks. However, percentage of women on the 
board (GENDIVER) was significantly negative. 
This result is in line with Renee and Daniel (2009) 
that addition of women to the board generally 
shows no effect, or negative effects. In addition, 
Renee and Daniel (2009) further established a 
negative effect of women board members using 
both Tobin‟s q and ROA and conclude that firms 
that are having good runs are more likely to 
appoint women, but that once appointed, women 
have neutral or negative effects on performance. 
CONCLUSIONAND RECOMMENDATIONSON 
This study therefore concludes that, though, the 
corporate governance mechanisms in the bailed 
out banks showed a positive signs, they were 
however not significant to boost financial 
performance of the affected banks. This could be 
as a result of the composition of some of the 
boards which clearly violate the provision in the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Code. 
Secondly, the non significant of the result could 
also be a result of CEOs and the management 
overbearing influence on the activities of other 
parties which the Central Bank Governor alluded 
to in 2010. Therefore, the removals of the CEOs 
could have a political undertone as claimed in 
some quarters (though outside the purview of this 
study), our results however demonstrated that, 
the corporate governance practices in the affected 
banks were largely not in conformity with the 
provisions in the Securities and Exchange 
Commission Code which the Central Bank of 
Nigeria governor leverage on as basis for their 
removals (Sanusi, 2010). 
The results suggest important implications for 
practitioners and policy makers in Nigeria. One 
important and major implication is that, the 
variables measured in this study are of great 
importance to boost financial performance of 
banks in Nigeria but they must be properly 
constituted. Therefore, Nigeria needs to 
strengthen policies by ensuring that the provision 
made in the Nigeria Securities and Exchange 
Commission Code of 2011 about the composition 
of both the board and the audit committee 
members is enforced particularly when new 
members are being considered. In addition, as 
postulated in Ojeka, Kanu and Owolabi (2013), the 
independence of audit committee members 
should be enhanced by ensuring that more of 
independent directors are introduced into the 
audit committee as against non-executive directors 
who still hold one form of interest or the other in 
the firm. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table I: CBN/NDIC Special Audit Report 
                                                                   Source: CBN, Vetiva Research, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Outcome of the CBN decision on the Report of the Special Audit Results 
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Table 3 Total Insider Related Loans 
 Source: Adapted from (Moses, 2011) 
S/n Year Total Insider Related Loan 
  N‟ Billion  
1  2006  12.7  
2  2007  44.75  
3  2008  16.41  
4  2009  2.21  
 
Table 4 Breakdown of Total Insider Related Loans 
Source: Adapted from (Moses, 2011) 
BANK  2009  2008  2007  2006  
N’ Billion N’ Billion  N’ Billion  N’ Billion  N’ Billion  
FIN  -  4.43  0.86  -  
INTERCONTINENTAL  -  7.67  1.05  -  
OCEANIC  -  -  22.70  2.36  
PHB  -  1.97  1.86  -  
UNION  2.21  2.34  1.67  0.81  
WEMA  -  -  16.61  9.53  
TOTAL  2.21  16.41  44.75  12.7  
 
Table 5 Cases of Corporate Governance Abuse 
Source: www.centbank.com 
S/n Bank Reported Cases 
1 Intercontinental 1. 30% of the share capital purchased with 
customer deposits 
2 Oceanic 1. CEO of Oceanic bank controlled over 35% 
of the bank through SPVs borrowing 
customer deposits 
3 Afri Bank 1. Depositors‟ funds were used to purchase 
80% of its Initial Public Offer (IPO) 
 
2. N25 was paid per share as dividend when 
the shares were trading at N11 on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) and which 
later collapsed to under N3. 
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Table 6 Summary of Variables Measurement/Description 
Name of variables Acronym Measurement 
Dependent Variable   
Return on Asset ROA PAT/Total Assets             
Independent Variables   
Chief Executive Officer Duality CEOD This is a dummy variable that 
represents 1 if the CEO is the 
same as the chairman of the 
board and 0 if the two positions 
are separated 
Board Independence BOARDIN This variable is measured as the 
ratio of independent board 
directors to the total numbers of 
directors on the board 
Audit Committee AUDCOMM It is measured as the ratio of non-
executive directors in the 
committee to the total audit 
committee members 
Gender Diversity GENDIVER This measures the ratio of 
women on the board to the total 
number of board members 
 
Table 7 Descriptive Statistics for all the selected Banks (2003-2009) 
 
 
Variables 
Year 
Observations 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Return on Assets 
Board Size 
Percentage of non-executive 
director on the audit committee 
CEO in audit committee 
Percentage of women on the 
board 
Percentage of independent non-
executive director on the board 
CEO duality 
38 
41 
41 
 
41 
41 
 
 
41 
41 
 
.0133653 
14.65854 
40.04065 
 
.2439024 
4.808417 
 
1.650984 
 
.195122 
.0319492 
3.229627 
18.08732 
 
.4347694 
4.83427 
 
4.051403 
 
.4012177 
-.1042801 
9 
16.66667 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
.0433664 
20 
75 
 
1 
14.28571 
 
16.66667 
 
1 
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Table 8 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
Dependent/Independent Variables Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Return on Assets 
 
.231866 .007603 .189314 .02746 -.00348 .00952 
Board Size 
 
11.14286 13 14.57143 15.5 18.142 15.714 
Percentage of non-executive director 
on the audit committee 
 
16.66667 60.71429 50 16.6667 50 42.857 
CEO in audit committee 
 
0 .5714286 0 1 0 0 
Percentage of women on the board 
 
0 9.260037 1.785714 9 4.7292 4.6738 
Percentage board independence 
2.727273 3.221288 0 0 0 3.7214 
CEO duality 
0 .5714286 0 0.6667 0 0 
Where: B1 – Afribank, B2 – Oceanic Bank, B3 – Plantinum Habib Bank, B4 – Intercontinental Bank, B5 –                   
First Inland Bank, B6 – Union Bank 
 
Table 9 Test of Correlation between independent variables and ROA  
VARIABLES ROA BOS PONED POWOB POBIND CEODUA 
ROA 1 
    
  
BOS -0.2738 1 
   
  
PONED -0.1418 0.0471 1 
  
  
POWOB -0.3008 0.2083 0.3273 1 
 
  
POBIND -0.1881 0.0121 -0.01 0.2094 1   
CEODUA 0.2874 -0.375 0.0497 0.4198 -0.2228 1 
Note: ROA in this table represents Return on Asset and it represents one of the financial performance variables for this study, 
BOS represents Board size, PONED represents Percentage of non-executive director in the audit committee, POWOB represents 
Percentage of women on the board, POBIND represents Percentage of board independence and CEODUA represents CEO 
duality. 
 
Table 10 Regression Analysis 
 
 Financial Performance Measurement 
Independent Variables ROA 
 Coefficient  
(t-statistics) 
P-value 
BSIZE 0.0004 
(0.25) 
0.806 
CEOD 0.0423*** 
2.54 
0.016 
BINDP 0.0003 
0.29 
0.772 
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ACINDP 0.0000 
0.07 
0.947 
GENDIVER -0.0037 
-2.58 
0.015* 
CONSTANT 0.0146 
0.49 
0.631 
P-value 
F-test 
R2 
R2 Adjusted 
No of Obs. 
0.0354 
2.75 
0.3007 
0.1914 
 
38 
Note: ROA is Return on Asset used to measure financial performance in this study, BOS represents Board size, 
PONED represents Percentage of non-executive director in the audit committee, POWOB represents Percentage of 
women on the board, POBIND represents Percentage of board independence and CEODUA represents CEO duality. 
*= significant at 1%; **= significant at 5%; ***= significant at 10% 
 
 
